I came across a recent study by Simon Thies titled: How Does the IASB Rationalize IFRS Standard-Setting Decisions and Construct Legitimacy? An Analysis of the Bases for Conclusions

The study cites a previous study on standard setters’ “rhetoric and construction of legitimacy:”

• …the US Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB’s) rhetorical strategy is mainly based on three elements: persuading the audience that the respective standard is good, silencing alternatives and criticism, and constructing itself as a good standard setter. The perception of a good standard is constructed by using four elements: reality as an authority, users as authority, consistency, and practicality…The construction of a good standard setter mainly builds on presenting a standard setter that only takes action when necessary, is embedded in a network of various actors that are consulted, follows a rigorous process, and considers various details in its deliberations…

It reaches the following conclusion:

• Based on a content analysis of the (basis for conclusions) relating to IFRS 17, 16, 15, 14, and the (Conceptual Framework), the study shows that the IASB primarily refers to users’ and preparers’ presumed needs, various details with regard to the characteristics of contracts and transactions, its own standards in terms of consistency, as well as the adoption and rejection of stakeholder views. These different types of factors reflect both the technical and stakeholder-oriented nature of IFRS standard setting. The above-mentioned references help the IASB rhetorically construct the notion of a good standard, silence alternatives, and present itself as a good standard setter.
• ..this study concludes that the IASB deliberately or habitually prioritizes the construction of (expected) output legitimacy in its decision-making communication through the BCs and (feedback statements). The types of factors that the IASB most frequently refers to, particularly users’ and preparers’ presumed needs according to the CF, primarily relate to the quality and effectiveness of the standards, and thus (expected) output legitimacy. Conversely, the IASB could also emphasize the inclusiveness of its deliberations and the transparency of its decision-making rationales by explicitly outlining all relevant stakeholders’ views and their consideration. This would be a strategy of legitimacy construction that rather focuses on the input and throughput dimension. However, with regard to both input and throughput legitimacy, the IASB almost exclusively focuses on users and preparers. Therefore, this study further concludes, that the IASB accepts certain limitations to the construction of input and especially throughput legitimacy in order to prioritize the output dimension of legitimacy.
• Nevertheless, the IASB seeks to construct input and throughput legitimacy through its decision-making communication, in particular by referring to a certain level of consensus among stakeholders when explaining a decision. Moreover, the IASB emphasizes its efforts to reconcile users’ and preparers’ diverging views and needs, sometimes even together with both stakeholder groups.

One might struggle to comprehend why any of that is of much interest. Here are a few tidbits from the body of the study:

• the IASB breaks the notion that ‘the Board’ is a closed, uniform body, in that it explicitly describes the inconsistency of its decisions over time due to its changing composition. In contrast, the literature on standard setters’ rhetoric usually finds that standard setters create some distance between themselves and their own decisions and present themselves as monolithic entities in order to create an impression of objectivity…
• When rejecting (proposed) alternatives, the IASB usually provides a number of reasons for its decision, which underlines its attempt to silence these alternatives effectively. In this context, the IASB’s use of frequency descriptions also helps silence alternatives, since opposing stakeholders would have to argue against ‘many’ stakeholders or even ‘most’ of the stakeholders. However, the IASB presents itself as being substantially more responsive compared to (previous findings) on the FASB that ‘more frequently, the criticisms of respondents and possible alternatives are presented only to be disposed of and thereby silenced’ 
• The various consultative bodies are only rarely mentioned by the IASB, and thus do not seem to be particularly relevant to its strategy of constructing input legitimacy. This is surprising, given the relatively high number of such bodies and the IFRSF’s statement that these consultative bodies are ‘important channels for us to gather input’. Similarly, with regard to the quasi-absence of geographic aspects of stakeholder input, it is surprising that the IASB’s internationality is not reflected in its construction of input legitimacy, although stakeholders’ geographic affiliations are clearly relevant for input legitimacy…

I don’t take the study to be arguing that the standards would be significantly different if the IASB placed a greater emphasis on “input legitimacy,” only that it would be (even?) more transparent how they responded to all the suggestions put to them. It’s unclear to me that this would really matter: we know that some stakeholders at least would prefer an IASB that moved more quickly to develop and issue standards, presumably even at the cost of a modest reduction in (in the terminology of the study) perceived legitimacy. What would it take, one wonders, for the IASB ever to be perceived as actually illegitimate? Perhaps the concerted assaults of a Trump-like figure?

The opinions expressed are solely those of the author.